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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
STATUTES
Section 16-10-139, Utah Code Ann. (repealed by Laws 1992, ch.
277, section 248)
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without
authority so to do shall be jointly and severally
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or
arising as a result thereof.
Section 16-10-88.2(1), Utah Code Ann. (1988)(repealed by Laws
1992, ch. 277, section 248)
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more
than 30 days after the mailing of the notice of
delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this
section or under Section 59-7-155, the division shall
mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, unless
the corporation's certificate of incorporation is
already suspended for any reason.
Section 16-10-88.2(1), Utah Code Ann. (1990)(amending 16-1088.2(1)(1988)(repealed by Laws 1992, ch. 277, section 248)
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more
than 30 days after the mailing of the notice of
delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this
section or under Section 59-7-155, the division shall
mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, unless
the corporation's certificate of incorporation is
already suspended for any reason. A corporation that
is suspended continues its corporate existence and may
carry on any business so long as it also takes the
necessary steps to remedy its suspended status and
restore the corporation to good standing.
Section 16-10-101, Utah Code Ann. (repealed by Laws 1992, ch.
277, section 248)
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or
(2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its
period of duration, the corporate existence of such
corporation shall nevertheless continue for the purpose
of winding up its affairs in respect to any property
and assets which have not been distributed or otherwise
disposed of prior to such dissolution, and to effect
such purpose such corporation may sell or otherwise
dispose of such property and assets, sue and be sued,

contract, and exercise all other incidental and
necessary powers,
RULES
Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P.
Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from
the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within 30 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However,
when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P.
Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the
trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the
judgment would be required if the motion is granted;
(3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other
such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial
court by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial;
or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal
filed before the disposition of any of the above
motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal
must be filed within the prescribed time measured from
the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of
the motion as provided above.
Rule 4(e), Utah R. App. P.
Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend
the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of
the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A
2

motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time
may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise
requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties
in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial
court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
REPLY TO APPELLEE TODD CROSLANDTS ARGUMENT
I. BOTH OF PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICES OF APPEAL WERE VALID.
A. This Court does not have jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the trial court misapplied Utah R. App. P.
4(e) because Todd did not file a notice of appeal from the
trial court's order granting Appellants an extension of time
in which to file their Notice Of Appeal.
In part I of his Argument, Defendant/Appellee Todd Crosland1
contends that the trial court misapplied Rule 4(e) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure when it issued its July 14, 1993,
Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time in
which to file their Notice Of Appeal.

The merits of Todd's

argument will be addressed in parts B and C below.
At the outset, however, it should be noted that this Court
does not have jurisdiction to consider the trial court's July 14,
1993, Order, for the simple reason that Todd did not file a
notice of appeal with respect to that Order.2

See, e.g. Nelson

v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983)(timely notice of appeal is a

*In order to distinguish him from Defendant/Appellee/CrossAppellant Jeff Crosland, Todd Crosland will hereinafter be
referred to by his given name.
2

Likewise, Plaintiffs are now foreclosed from challenging
the trial court's determination that any failure of Plaintiffs to
timely file a notice of appeal in connection with the February
18, 1993, Amended Order was not the result of "excusable neglect"
within the meaning of Rule 4(e), Utah R. App. P. (R.519)
3

prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction).
B. The trial court properly applied Rule 4(e) in granting
Plaintiffs an extension of time in which to file their
Notice of Appeal*
In support of his argument that the trial court misapplied
Rule 4(e) in issuing its July 14, 1993, Order granting Plaintiffs
an extension of time in which to file their Notice Of Appeal,
Todd relies on federal caselaw interpreting Rule 4(a)(5) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 4(a)(5) of the federal

rules is virtually identical to Rule 4(e) of the Utah rules.

The

federal caselaw upon which Todd relies interprets the "good
cause" standard set forth in federal Rule 4(a)(5) as being
applicable only where a motion for an extension of time is filed
prior to the expiration of the time for filing an appeal. See,
e.g., State of Oregon v. Champion International Corporation, 680
F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).

It is Todd's contention that,

because Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time in the case at
bar was not filed until after the expiration of the time for
filing an appeal, the district court abused its discretion when
it found that Plaintiffs had demonstrated "good cause" for any3

3

As will be discussed below, Plaintiffs do not believe that
their original March 18, 1993, Notice of Appeal was untimely.
However, in light of the Motion To Dismiss which was filed by
Todd with this Court, Plaintiffs requested that the trial court:
(a) assume that the March 18, 1993, Notice of Appeal was
premature; (b) find that Plaintiffs had demonstrated either
"excusable neglect" or "good cause" within the meaning of Rule
4(e); and (c) grant Plaintiffs an extension of time in which to
file their Notice of Appeal. The trial court found that
Plaintiffs had demonstrated "good cause" and granted Plaintiffs'
request for additional time to file their Notice of Appeal.
(R.519)
4

failure to timely file their Notice of Appeal.
As Todd Acknowledges, however, the federal circuits are
split on the question of whether the "good cause" standard
applies only to motions filed prior to the expiration of the time
for filing an appeal or whether it also applies to motions filed
after the expiration of the appeal time.

Criticizing the Oregon

court's holding that the "good cause" standard applies only to
motions filed prior to the expiration of the filing period, the
First Circuit in Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300, 301 (1st Cir.
1986), stated that:
We regard the Oregon courtf s statement that the phrase
"good cause" is applicable only when the motion is
filed before the time for filing the appeal has
expired, 680 F.2d at 1310, as an unwarranted maiming of
the rule... The rule expressly recognizes fgood cause1
as a basis for extension both before and after the
expiration of the appeal time.
(Emphasis added).4
Likewise, Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
expressly, clearly5 and unambiguously recognizes "good cause" as
4

Todd refers to the Scarpa court's language as "dicta". See
Todd's Brief at page 8, n.l. That is not correct. The Scarpa
court specifically found that "There was no mistake by counsel,
excusable or otherwise", that the plaintiff had "mistook the
ground for his motion" when he requested that the trial court
find "excusable neglect", and that the trial "court should have
given the motion a practical meaning [citation omitted] as
including "good cause," and should have found such." 782 F.2d at
301.
5

In Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1991),
the court recognized that the language of federal Rule 4(a)(5)
"could hardly be clearer." See also, Jeffers v. Clinton, 796
F.Supp. 1202, 1205 (E.D.Ark. 1992) (Eisele, J.,
concurring)("Remarkably, the second sentence of the Rule actually
does manage to make the first sentence even clearer than it
already is").
5

a basis for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal both
before and "not later than 30 days after" the expiration of the
appeal time.6
A leading treatise on the federal rules refers to the First
Circuit's decision in Scarpa as the "better view".

16 Wright,

Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice And Procedure, Section 3950,
page 562 (1993 Supplement).7
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court adopt the
better view of Rule 4(e) and find that the trial court properly
applied Rule 4(e) in granting Plaintiffs an extension of time in
which to file their Notice Of Appeal.

6

It is significant that Rule 4(e) is specific in its
requirement that motions for extension filed "before the
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte ...", while
motions filed "after the prescribed time" may be granted only
after ,f[n]otice [is] given to the other parties in accordance
with the rules of practice of the trial court." Thus, if the
drafters of Rule 4(e) had intended for the "good cause" standard
to apply only to motions filed prior to the expiration of the
prescribed time, they clearly knew how to say so.
7

The authors explain that "The history of the rule, however,
has caused most courts of appeals to read the rule differently.
As originally drafted, the rule allowed an extension on a showing
of good cause only if the motion was filed during the original
appeal time; the Note of the Advisory Committee stated that only
excusable neglect would justify an extension on motion filed
after expiration of the original time. The text of the Rule was
changed, but the Note was not changed. Relying on the Note,
several courts of appeals have held that only a showing of
excusable neglect ... can justify an extension of appeal time on
motion filed after expiration of the original time... If this
view is to be adopted, however, it should be supported by an
amendment to the Rule that brings the text into conformity with
the practice... the Rules either should be interpreted to mean
what they say or should be amended to say what they mean." Id. at
486-87 (emphasis added).
6

C. Plaintiffs' original March 18, 1993, Notice of Appeal was
timely filed.
The Amended Order which is the subject of the instant appeal
was entered by the district court on February 18, 1993.

In

accordance with Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., however, the Amended Order
did not become final and appealable until the entry of Judgment
against Defendant Jeff Crosland on March 9, 1993.

Plaintiffs

filed their original Notice Of Appeal from the Amended Order on
March 18, 1993.

The next day, on March 19, 1993, Jeff Crosland

filed a Rule 59 motion in connection with the Judgment entered
against him.

There were no Rule 50, Rule 52, or Rule 59 motions

filed in connection with the Amended Order.
In connection with his Motion To Dismiss Appeal8 filed with
this Court and again in his brief, however, Todd argues that, in
accordance with Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Jeff Crosland*s Rule 59 motion filed in connection
with the March 9 Judgment entered against him operated to toll
the time for filing a notice of appeal in connection with the
trial court's February 18, 1993, Amended Order.
There is no support for Todd's reading of Rule 4(b).

To the

contrary, read in context, a consistent application of Rule 4(b)
mandates an interpretation pursuant to which Jeff Crosland's Rule
59 motion operated to toll the notice of appeal filing period
only with respect to the Judgment entered against him, not with
respect to the prior unrelated Amended Order.
8

Todd's Motion To Dismiss Appeal was denied by order dated
August 4, 1993.
7

Rule 4(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
... the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P.(Emphasis added).

Rule 4(b) goes on to

provide that:
If a timely [Rule 59] motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party ... the
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of
the order denying [the Rule 59 motion]... A notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of [the Rule 59 motion]
shall have no effect.
Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P.
Paragraph (a) of Rule 4 speaks only of the "judgment or
order appealed from".

Paragraph (b), in turn, speaks of the

running of the "time for appeal" upon the filing in the trial
court of certain post-trial motions and clearly refers to the
"judgment or order appealed from" addressed in paragraph (a).
Thus, read together with paragraph (a), paragraph (b) of Rule 4
provides for the tolling of the time for filing an appeal with
respect to the "judgment or order appealed from,"

And, even

though the time for filing an appeal is tolled for "all parties"
upon the timely filing of the specified motions with respect to
the "judgment or order appealed from", Rule 4(b) says nothing
about tolling the time for filing an appeal with respect to all
orders entered in the case, as Todd would have this Court
believe.
Not only is there no Utah case law interpreting Rule 4(b) as
applying to judgments or orders other than the "judgment or order
appealed from", Plaintiffs have been unable to find any caselaw
8

from any jurisdiction, state or federal, which interprets similar
rules of appellate procedure in such a manner.
Furthermore, interpreting Rule 4(b) as applying to all
judgments and orders entered in a case, rather than only from the
judgment or order "appealed from", would lead to absurd r
esults.

For example, suppose that (instead of February 18, 1993)

the Amended Order had been entered in March of 1991 when the
trial court originally addressed the question of summary judgment
with respect to ToddfS involvement in this case and further
suppose that the Amended Order had been certified as final at
that time in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Finally, suppose that (instead of March 18,

1993) Plaintiffs had filed their original Notice of Appeal from
the Amended Order in April of 1991, and that this Court had
affirmed the Amended Order in April of 1992. Would the filing of
Jeff Crosland's Rule 59 motion in March of 1993 have operated to
toll the time for filing the notice of appeal in connection with
the March 1991 Amended Order.

Would Rule 4(b) have rendered

Plaintiffs' April 1991 notice of appeal of "no effect" and
required Plaintiffs to file a new notice of appeal "within the
prescribed time measured from the entry of the [trial court's May
25, 1993, order] disposing of the [Rule 59] motion ..."
Clearly, such a result would be absurd.

Yet, that is

exactly what Todd's interpretation of Rule 4(b) would require.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court
should reject the interpretation of Rule 4(b) urged by Todd and
9

find that Plaintiff's original March 18, 1993, Notice Of Appeal
was timely filed.
II. TODD CROSLAND IS LIABLE FOR CROSLAND INDUSTRIES1 OBLIGATIONS
TO PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE HE ASSUMED TO ACT AS A CORPORATION WITHOUT
AUTHORITY SO TO DO.
A. Todd misreads the Gillham opinion.
In Gillham9, the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant,
Ipson, personally liable pursuant to Section 16-10-139, U.C.A.
(hereinafter referred to as "Section 139"), for a debt incurred
by him on behalf of a suspended Nevada corporation.

The Supreme

Court of Utah identified, inter alia, the following undisputed
facts involved in the case: (1) Ipson was connected with a
suspended Nevada corporation named Bonneville Raceways Park; (2)
Ipson unsuccessfully attempted to qualify the suspended Nevada
corporation to do business in Utah; and (3) Ipson executed the
subject agreement by signing "Bonneville Raceways by Robert K.
Ipson, President."

567 P.2d at 164.

The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment holding Ipson personally liable for the debt pursuant to
Section 139.

Although the majority opinion is less than a model

of clarity, read together with the Justice Maughan's dissenting
opinion, it is clear that personal liability was premised upon
the fact that Bonneville Raceways had been suspended under Nevada
law and, therefore, that Ipson had assumed to act as a
corporation without authority when he executed the agreement on

9

Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163
(Utah 1977).
10

behalf of the defunct corporation.
As does Todd in the case at bar, the Gillham dissent argued
that Section 139, which is identical to Section 146 of the Model
Business Corporation Act, was designed to prohibit the
application of the doctrine of de facto corporations.
at 165-66.

567 P.2d

According to the dissent, the defendant would only be

liable under section 139 "if Bonneville Raceways does not exist
as a corporate entity [and] [s]ince Bonneville Raceways is a
Nevada corporation, whether such an entity is a corporation is
determined by the laws of Nevada."

567 P.2d at 166.

The dissent

concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate because there
remained a question of fact as to whether Bonneville Raceways
still existed as a corporate entity despite its suspended status
due to the fact that, under Nevada law, its corporate charter
might not have been revoked until after Ipson executed the
agreement on behalf of the corporation.

567 P.2d at 167.

In his brief, however, Todd simplistically contends that the
Gillham Court upheld the trial courtf s finding of personal
liability solely by reason of the fact that Ipson signed the

10

The Tenth Circuit agreed with this reading of Gillham in
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982),
explaining that "[i]n [Gillham] the Utah Supreme Court found a
racetrack operator personally liable for an advertising debt of
his Nevada corporation, according to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. Section 16-10-139, the corporation having become defunct
under the laws of Nevada... At the time the defendant executed
the agreement as president of Bonneville Raceways there was no
such corporation of which he was president. He never qualified
his corporation to do business in Utah. Bonneville Raceways1
corporate status was suspended in Nevada for failure to file its
annual form and pay the filing fee."
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agreement as president of "Bonneville Raceways", rather than as
president of "Bonneville Raceways Park."
Todd's reading of the Gillham decision, while not frivolous,
renders the dissenting opinion superfluous and should be
rejected•

The dissenting opinion makes clear that the basis of

the majority opinion was the fact that Bonneville Raceways1
corporate powers had been suspended under Nevada law and,
therefore, that Ipson had "assume[d] to act as a corporation
without authority so to do" in violation of Section 139.
B. Todd also misreads the "legislative history" to the Model
Business Corporation Act.
Based upon the Comment to Section 146 of the Model Business
Corporation Act, Todd contends that Section 139 was enacted only
to abolish "de facto" corporations.

Assuming that it is

appropriate for this Court to divine the Utah legislature's sole
intent in enacting Section 139 from the Comment to the MBCA,
Todd's argument that Section 139 is not applicable to this case
is still not persuasive because he defines the doctrine of de facto
corporations too narrowly.
According to Todd, "A de facto corporation existed at common
law where there was a bone fide but defective or incomplete attempt
to incorporate and the would-be incorporators had done business
as a corporation."11
it goes,

While this definition is accurate as far as

the "References" which the drafters of section 146 of

the Model Business Corporation Act direct the reader's attention
n

See Brief Of Appellee Todd Crosland at page 12, n.6.
12

to, as well as a substantial body of caselaw, clearly reveal that
it is underinclusive.
At paragraph 5 of section 146, Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d,
the drafters reference: "Revival of corporation terminates
agent's liability on post forfeiture contract, 19 Md L Rev 144
(1959)."

As its title suggests, the Maryland Law Review article

discusses the personal liability exposure of corporate officers,
directors and shareholders for contracts entered into during the
period between the forfeiture of a corporation's charter and its
revival.

At page 146, n.10, of the article, the author notes

caselaw "where corporate directors or stockholders were not
personally liable for business conducted after expiration of
their charter, involving an extension of the doctrine of de facto
corporations."

(Emphasis added).

Again at page 148, n.18, the

author notes the holding in Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 F. 613 (2d
Cir. 1919), where the "Court stated that during the interval
between [forfeiture and revival] the corporation was at least a
de facto corporation.

19 Col. L. Rev., supra, n. 14, takes issue

with the Court's extension of the de facto corporation doctrine."
(Emphasis added).
Again at paragraph 5 of section 146, Model Bus. Corp. Act
Ann. 2d [1977 Supp.], the drafters reference the Oklahoma court
of appeals' decision in Phillips & Strong Engineering Co. v.
Howard B. James Associates, Inc., 529 P.2d 1013 (Okla. Ct. App.
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1974).

The Phillips case raised and answered
the question of whether ... a corporate officer is
personally liable for rent becoming due on his
corporation's month-to-month written rental agreement
after its license to do business in Oklahoma has been
suspended by the Oklahoma Tax Commissioner. We hold
the officer is liable and reverse the court's summary
judgment in favor of defendant ...

529 P.2d at 1014 (emphasis added).
Thus, the drafters of the MBCA clearly had in mind precisely
the situation involved in the case at bar when they drafted
section 146.
The following additional caselaw demonstrates that the de
facto corporation doctrine has been applied by numerous court's
where a corporation's powers have been suspended for failure to
file its annual reports.

People v. Zimbelman, 572 P.2d 830, 833

(Colo. 1977)(corporation suspended for failure to file annual
report continues to exist as de facto corporation); Billings v.
Micciche, 691 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Colo. App. 1984)(suspension of
corporation for failure to pay fees and file annual report does
not necessarily preclude continued existence as de fdCtO
corporation) rev'd on other grounds 727 P.2d 367 (1986); McGown
v. Kittel, 480 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App. 1972)(corporation
continued to act as a de facto corporation after forfeiture but
prior to dissolution); Bergy Bros., Inc. v. Zeeland Feeder Pig,
Inc., 292 N.W-2d 493, 497 (Mich. App. 1980)(generally, a
corporation failing to meet conditions subsequent to
incorporation retains de facto status); Clark-Franklin-Kingston
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Press v. Romano, 529 A.2d 240, 243 (Conn. App. 1987)(Connecticut
has not yet ruled on the issue of whether a de jure corporation
which has had its powers suspended can continue to function as a
de facto corporation).
Accordingly, even if Todd is correct that Section 139 was
enacted solely for the purpose of abolishing the doctrine of de
facto corporations, his argument proves too much.

The case at bar

is precisely the type of case which the drafters of the MBCA
intended for the Model Act's counterpart to Section 139 to be
applied.
C. The language of Section 139 is plain and unambiguous and
should be construed accordingly.
Section 139 does not require this Court to divine the
legislative intent behind its enactment.

The language of Section

139 is plain and unambiguous:
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without
authority so to do shall be jointly and severally
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or
arising as a result thereof.
This Court has held that "when statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the same to divine
legislative intent.

Rather, we construe a statute according to

its plain language."

Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828

P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah App. 1992).
Accordingly, Section 139 should be interpreted in accordance
with its plain and unambiguous meaning, i.e., as mandating joint
and several liability for all persons who assume to act as a
corporation without authority to do so.
15

In the case at bar, there is no question that Todd was
assuming to act as a corporation when he negotiated and
authorized Jeff Crosland to execute the CI Guarantees.

Nor is

there any question that Todd was without authority to act as a
corporation due to the suspension of CIfs corporate powers.
Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, Inc., 460
P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 1969)(a suspended corporation cannot engage
in carrying forward its business)12; see also Carolina
Transformer Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 341 So.2d 1327 (Miss.
1977)(owner of suspended corporation personally liable for debt
incurred while assuming to act as a corporation); Phillips &
Stong Eng. Co. v. Howard B. James Assoc, Inc., 529 P.2d 1013
(Okl. App. 1974)(corporate president held personally liable for
rent obligation incurred after suspension); Priceco, Inc. v.
Youngstrom, 786 P.2d 606 (Idaho App. 1990)(corporate officers who
continue business after forfeiture may be held liable for debts
incurred); Kessler Distributing Company v. Neill, 317 N.W.2d 519
(Iowa App. 1982)(president of corporation was personally liable
for debts incurred after forfeiture).

12

In Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, the Court cited as
additional authority its decision in Houston v. Utah Lake Land,
Water & Power Co., 157 P. 174 (Utah 1919), "which indicates that
the right of a corporation whose charter had been forfeited, to
wind up its affairs, did not authorize it to engage in new
business." 460 P.2d at 829, n.3. In the case at bar, Todd
Crosland has not, and could not, argue that the negotiation and
execution of the CI Guarantees was accomplished as part of the
winding up of CIfs affairs.
16

It is significant that Section 16-10-88.2(1), U.C.A., was
amended in 1990 to add the following sentence:
A corporation that is suspended continues its corporate
existence and may carry on any business so long as it
also takes the necessary steps to remedy its suspended
status and restore the corporation to good standing,
(Emphasis added).

While this sentence was added by the 1990

amendments, its legislative history states that it was added as a
clarification of existing law.
108, 1990 Utah Laws 386.

Act of April 23, 1990, Chapter

In other words, the addition of the

last sentence to section 16-10-88.2(1) was not intended to make
any substantive change to existing law, but, rather, was intended
to clarify the law as it existed at that time.
Accordingly, because it is undisputed that Todd failed to
remedy CI?s corporate status and restore it to good standing, it
is even more clear that he assumed to act as a corporation
without authority to do so when he negotiated the CI Guarantees
after the suspension of CIfs corporate powers. Therefore,
pursuant to the plain language of Section 16-10-139, he should be
held personally liable for the guarantees.
D. The imposition of personal liability pursuant to Section
139 would not be inconsistent with the winding up powers
granted in Section 16-10-101•
Citing Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van Gas,
Inc., 460 P.2d 828 (Utah 1969), Todd contends that "The Business
Corporation Act cannot be read to require and allow officers and
directors to wind up the affairs of a dissolved corporation,
which includes settling claims against the corporation ... and at
the same time impose personal liability on them for doing so.
17

This conflict would exist if appellants' reading of section 139
were adopted. "13
This contention is specious.

Neither Mackay & Knobel

Enterprises nor section 16-10-101, U.C.A. (which grants dissolved
corporations certain powers during the winding up process) lend
any support to Todd's position.
In Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, the Court specifically
recognized that the "right of a corporation whose charter had
been forfeited, to wind up its affairs, did not authorize it to
engage in new business."

460 P.2d at 829, n.3 (citing Houston v.

Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 187 P. 174 (1919))(emphasis
added).
Consistently, section 16-10-101 provides in pertinent part
that:
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation ...
the corporate
existence
of such corporation shall

nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up its
affairs in respect to any property and assets which
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of
prior to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose
such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers.
(Emphasis added).
In short, under Utah law, a dissolved corporation's
"corporate existence" continues only for the purpose of winding
up its affairs and the only powers it retains are those which are
necessary or incidental to accomplishment of the winding up

13

Brief Of Appellee Todd Crosland at pages 15-16, n.7.
18

process.
Likewise, pursuant to section 16-10-88.2(1), a suspended
corporation "continues its corporate existence and may carry on
any business so long as it also takes the necessary steps to
remedy its suspended status and restore the corporation to good
standing." (Emphasis added).
Thus, there is no conflict between Utah law which authorizes
the exercise of powers necessary or incidental to winding up
corporate affairs and the imposition of personal liability under
Section 139 for those continuing to engage in corporate business
unrelated to the winding up process.
E. The caselaw relied upon by Todd is distinguishable.
Todd relies heavily on the Supreme Court of Colorado's
decision in Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1986).

In

that case, the court held that C.R.S. section 7-3-104, a Colorado
statute identical to Section 139, did not impose personal
liability upon corporate officers for obligations incurred while
the corporation's powers were under suspension.

In addition to

finding support in the Comment to the MCBA14, and certain caselaw
which will be further discussed below, the court's decision was
based on the peculiar circumstances of Colorado law under which
section 7-3-104 was enacted, circumstances which were not present

14

As demonstrated in part IIB above, the court's reliance
upon the Comment to the MBCA is unwarranted.
19

in Utah law in 1953 when Section 139 was enacted.
As did the Micciche court, Todd also relies on United States
v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.
1977); Creditors Protective Association, Inc. v. Baksay, 573 P.2d
776 (Or 1978); and Tagliani v. Colwell, 517 P.2d 207 (Wash.
1973).

Each of these cases is distinguishable.

In Standard Beauty the Ninth Circuit rejected the lower
court's assumption that section 23301 of the California Revenue
and Tax Code which provided for the suspension of a corporation's
powers for failure to pay its franchise taxes "operates to pierce
the corporate veil absent overriding equities."

561 F.2d at 776.

There was not a statute similar to Section 139 involved in that
case.

Instead:
To back up the suspension, the California legislature
also provided that any contract made in violation of
section 23301 was voidable at the instance of other
parties to the contract ... and that any person
purporting to exercise the corporate powers, rights and
privileges would be subject to criminal penalties and
fines.

561 F.2d at 776.

15

The Micciche court noted that "prior to the enactment of
section 7-3-104 in 1958, Colorado statutory law imposed personal
liability on the officers and directors of a corporation for
corporate debts if the corporation failed to file a corporate
report [citation omitted] and a later version of this statute
limited liability to one thousand dollars [citation omitted].
However, the Colorado Corporation Act of 1958, of which section
7-3-104 was an integral part, expressly repealed that statutory
penalty. If the legislature intended section 7-3-104 to apply to
officers of a validly formed but suspended corporation, it is
reasonable to assume that it would have made its intent as clear
as it had done in its prior enactments." 727 P.2d at 372
(emphasis added)•
20

The Oregon statute at issue in the Baksay case is similar to
Section 139, except that it specifically states that joint and
several liability only attaches to ".••persons who assume to act
as a corporation without the authority of a certificate of incorporation issued
by the Corporation Commissioner..."
added).

573 P. 2d at 768, n. 1 (emphasis

Thus, the Oregon statute is clearly limited in a manner

which Section 139 is not.

Compare Richmond Wholesale Meat Co. v.

Hughes, 625 F.Supp. 584, 588-89 (N.D.I11. 1985) where the court
distinguished the Oregon statute which "appears to address only
the situation in which the individuals act as a corporation where
the incorporation is defective" from an Illinois statute
identical to Section 139 which it found to be applicable to the
post-dissolution transaction at issue in that case.
Finally, while the Washington court of appeals1 decision in
Tagliani v. Colwell, 517 P.2d 207 (1973), is more on point with
the case at bar, it is still based upon peculiarities in the
Washington statutes which are not present in the Utah Code.

517

P.2d at 209-10.
F. The legislature could not have intended for the issuance
of a Certificate of Incorporation to function as a license to
ignore the requirements of corporate existence, as Todd Suggests.
In order to form a valid de j'ure corporation16, the
requirements of sections 16-10-48, 49 and 50, U.C.A., must be
satisfied.

In order to maintain its de jure status, a

corporation must comply with certain post incorporation
16

Under the Utah Business Corporation Act, 16-10-1 et seq.
(1953)(as amended).
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corporation must comply with certain post incorporation
requirements, including filing its annual reports.

Utah Code

Ann, sections 16-10-88.1 and 121. Unless those post
incorporation requirements of corporate existence are met, the
corporation's existence is first suspended, section 16-1088.2(1), and then, if the corporation fails to remedy its
suspended status and restore itself to good standing, the
corporation is dissolved, section 16-10-88.2(4).

Upon

dissolution, the corporation's existence continues only for the
purpose of winding up its affairs.

Section 16-10-101, U.C.A.

It is Todd's contention, however, that once a Certificate of
Incorporation is obtained a corporation maintains its de jure
status, i.e., its corporate existence, until after its postdissolution affairs are finally and completely wound up in
accordance with section 16-10-101.17
Corporate existence, however, is a creature of state law.
See, e.g. Gillham, supra, at 166.

The fact that the Utah

legislature has specified that a suspended corporation continues
to exist and may continue to carry on its business only "so long
as it also takes the necessary steps to remedy its suspended

17

In light of the fact that a dissolved corporation is
entitled to commence litigation in connection with predissolution claims for a period of two years following
dissolution, section 16-10-100, U.C.A., and is entitled to
commence litigation in connection with post-dissolution claims
within the applicable time frame set forth in Chapter 12 of Title
78 of the Utah Code Ann., see section 16-10-101, U.C.A., the
process of winding up the affairs of a dissolved corporation can,
and often does, take many years.
22

status and restore [itself] to good standing"u, and that a
dissolved corporation's "corporate existence [continues only] for
the purpose of winding up its affairs ...ltl9, compels the
conclusion that the legislature did not intend for the "de jure"
status of a corporation to survive should the corporation choose
to ignore the requirements of post-incorporation corporate
existence.
Just as compelling is the proposition that the legislature
could not have intended for the issuance of a certificate of
incorporation to function as a license for corporate agents to
ignore the requirements of post-incorporation corporate
existence, as Todd suggests.

It is unimaginable that the

legislature intended to imbue corporate agents with such
immunity.
Furthermore, unlike the statutory schemes at issue in the
cases upon which Todd relies20, other than Section 139, there is
no statutory provision in the Utah Business Corporation Act to
back up the prohibition against the continuance of corporate
business as usual following suspension and dissolution.
Accordingly, unless Section 139 imposes personal liability on
corporate agents for continuing to conduct business as usual
18

Utah Code Ann. section 16-10-88.2(1).

19

Utah Code Ann. section 16-10-101.

20

Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1986); United
States v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561 F.2d 774 (9th
Cir. 1977); Creditors Protective Association, Inc. v. Baksay, 573
P.2d 776 (Or. 1978)(); and Tagliana v. Colwell, 517 P.2d 207
(Wash. 1973).
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following the suspension of a corporation's powers, corporate
agents are indeed, as Todd suggests, free to ignore the
requirements of post-incorporation corporate existence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs submit that summary
judgment in Defendant Todd Crosland's favor was improper.

There

was no genuine issue of material fact before the district court;
however, it was Plaintiffs, not Todd Crosland, who were entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs

respectfully request that the district court's February 18, 1993,
Amended Order be reversed and that this matter be remanded with
instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment in
Plaintiffs1 favor on the First Cause Of Action alleged in the
Amended Complaint.
DATED this 1st day of November, 1993.
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